Shamsuddin Amin
Central Asian Studies Institute
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
May 2022
LOCALIZING WESTERN NORMS AND ELITE MANIPULATION OF DEVELOPMENTAL AND HUMANITARIAN AID
Introduction:
Afghanistan’s post-2001 reconstruction and development journey has made headlines in the news, with some outlets depicting the transformation of the country as a story of success, while others have extensively looked into the widespread corruption and elite manipulation that shadowed international aid(Dyer, 2016; Rasooly et al., 2014). Conventional wisdom suggests that the Taliban’s rise to power in 2021 is attributed to the deep-rooted corruption among the Afghan political elites and institutions of the republic. In developing and post-conflict countries, such as Afghanistan, clientelism and patrimonial politics are at the heart of these countries’ realities and journey of transformation, be it developmental, institutional, or any other major transformation(Amin, 2019). The case of Afghanistan is not any different. This article explores elite manipulation of Afghan institutions, and how these manipulations have increased aid dependency in Afghanistan. It also explores how clientelist elites and patronal politics shaped and localized these developmental and humanitarian projects, which led to the establishment of a rentier system that was reliant on aid money, without which it collapsed in its ruins. Drawing upon the case of Afghanistan, the article contends that in developing countries with a strong clientelist system, and the elites’ impact on the realities on the ground, it leads to unequal and opaque aid distribution that is susceptible to grand and pity corruption at all levels, which in turn has strong implications for the overall feasibility and success of the developmental and humanitarian project, leaving the state-dependent on such aid for years to come.
Afghanistan from 2001-2021:
Before the United States' involvement in Afghanistan in 2001, the country had seen significant political and social upheavals. Afghanistan's history and power transitions—from monarchs through the formation of the republic in 2004 and thereafter—have always been linked to undemocratic localist and traditional means and practices(Amin, 2019).The 2004 constitution, which acknowledged civil rights and laid the ground for the so-called start of the country’s journey towards democratization, was a watershed moment in the country's history(Amin, 2019). However, given Afghan society’s localist nature and history, such initiatives either exacerbated the divide between the Afghan ruling class and ordinary citizens or resulted in deep divisions among people in the periphery(Barfield & Nojumi, 2010). Thus, to overcome the traditional barriers and contain the role of local actors in the socio-political affairs, and transform towards democratization, a deep institutional restructuring occurred in the periphery (provinces) with the establishment of governmental institutions to serve as an alternative to the existent localist system in the country. Now as to what extent these institutions worked has been debated among scholars, with a majority of them holding the position that these alternative institutions were weak(Ozdemir, 2019), and could not handle the affairs, while simultaneously, undermining the traditional power structure that worked for centuries(Barfield & Nojumi, 2010).
The solution of the Kabul Administration under the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA) to shift the focus from local structures to a more formal structure had an unintended effect of establishing and strengthening elites (at times warlords with an extensive background of human rights abuses) that played a major role in how the Kabul Administration and the United States, since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, approached governance in the country, especially in the periphery and the remote localities. However, this approach created weak institutions—these institutions were incompatible with the realities on the ground and the localist societal structure which they aimed to manage and govern, and were easily susceptible to manipulation, capture and corruption by elites— that were unable to cope with the challenges a modern polity faces. Hence, they were susceptible to the cleanliest practice and patronage networks which led to the manipulation of aid money thereof by patronal elites. To better understand the role of elites in corruption and manipulation of aid money, one must look into the issue of how administrative corruption has influenced Afghanistan's development, rebuilding, state-building, and institution-building processes.
Manifestation of elite manipulation and corruption in Aid Projects:
With the US and allies aiming to help the IRA exert and stretch its authority and influence across the country and to pave the way for reconstruction and effective governance(Hess, 2010), as previously mentioned, the unintended consequences of the approach taken that empowered elites, and the unwillingness of the government officials, including that of President Karzai, has contributed immensely into the growth of clientelist networks. Clientelism, or patrimonial politics, can be defined as the existence of a structure within the power apparatus whereby the elites engage in favoritism practices that enhance their network for either monetary gains or political support. Patron-client relation is the system whereby an individual in power takes certain steps in return for expectations from the client, whereas patronage networks refer to the inclusion of a patron’s loyalists in the power apparatus for strengthening their grip overpower. To further elaborate, Neopatrimonialism is a system of a social hierarchy where patrons deplete state funds to secure the loyalty of clients, this is an informal patron-client relationship that can reach from very high up in state structures down to individuals in small villages(Laruelle, 2012). Although IRA inherited these patron-client dynamics(Sharan, 2011), little was done to overcome these divisions, and the approach that the IRA took towards local governance further strengthened these networks that at times relied on ethnolinguistic divisions in the country(Amin, 2019). Hence, the aid money the Afghan government received towards humanitarian aid to the people and aid in the rehabilitation and development of the country, was always divided among these lines, and patronage networks of the elites in power.
The US and its allies, international organizations, and donor agencies channeled billions of dollars through numerous programs. These programs ranged from developmental projects such as that of the National Solidarity Program to projects that aimed to provide immediate economic relief to the Afghan people such as that of the USAID providing cooking oil, wheat, and more basic items to school-age children in the periphery of the country. Thus, I explore some of these projects as those that were strictly based on community involvement and projects that were implemented by NGOs. By doing so, I explore how elites have manipulated these projects that have left the country dependent on aid.
Community-based developmental projects have recently gained momentum in developing countries with governments, donors, and funding agencies relying on them to better integrate, design, and adjust projects to local needs and priorities and increase community participation in the projects(Beath et al., 2015). This model was adopted in the case of Afghanistan with the National Solidarity Program (NSP)(Beath et al., 2015), the Community Based Municipality Support Program (CBMSP), and several other projects. The NSP was the initiative of the Afghan president-in-exile, Ashraf Ghani, who served as the finance minister in 2002, with the primary aim of “develop the ability of Afghan communities to identify, plan, manage and monitor their own development projects”(Building Trust in Government, n.d.). The NSP aimed to reach out to communities at the local level, mobilize them and establish local institutions, the Community Development Council (CDC), that essentially served as the De-Facto council for a specific area with a specific population(Beath et al., 2015). Also, at the district level, the District Development Associations (DDA) were established that were registered along with the CDCs and worked under the supervision of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD)(Building Trust in Government, n.d.).
In total, “nearly 35,000 communities had elected CDCs, of which all but 200 or so had been financed [up to 60,000$ USD(Anonymous, personal communication, May 4, 2022)] (at least partially) - there was nearly 300,000 male and just over 150,000 female members, elected by secret ballot across 361 districts in all of Afghanistan's 34 provinces”(Building Trust in Government, n.d.). Though the program was overall evaluated to be successful as it created local institutions—aimed at creating a link between the central government agencies and the localities— at the village level that would go hand-in-hand with implementing the government’s developmental agenda, stories from the ground presented a different dynamic. In an interview with an NGO worker, he highlighted the intervention of elites, government officials, and warlords in the direct and indirect intervention of the CDC creation and project processes(Anonymous, personal communication, May 4, 2022). The CDC's core leadership, deemed to be democratically elected through direct and secret ballot(Beath et al., 2015), usually had a direct intervention from powerful individuals (warlords, and elites) with a great degree of influence in the rural areas to choose from their own cronies[1]. Based on the author's personal experience working with the CDCs, the CDC leadership was directly linked to misappropriation, embezzlement, and contract-awarding to companies associated with the elites, both under the NSP program, and under various other humanitarian and developmental projects that relied on the CDC structure; such as —a project in which the author was directly involved that aimed to provide certified wheat seed and fertilizers to farmers in Laghman under a Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)—where CDC leadership introduced their relatives to receive the project input, and it was observed that government officials (including deputy provincial governors and district governors) blatantly intervened to further manipulate this process, either requesting funds for themselves or introducing their proxies[2].
NSP was one of Afghanistan’s biggest developmental projects since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, with more than 1.6 billion US dollars awarded to CDCs, and in 2012, the government allocated 208$ million dollars in funding for the project’s activities(Building Trust in Government, n.d.). The NSP, though, hailed as a success story of how community-driven development work, was seriously undermined by the manipulation of elites, that facilitated corrupt behavior within this project. As the NSP was critical to the establishment of the localized governance, and institution building to move away from the traditional sources of power, and influence in the periphery, it was used as one of the main institutions in future developmental, humanitarian, and other aid projects. Considering the level of corruption and manipulation that occurred in establishing the CDCs, future projects were seriously harmed by the structure that was established under the NSP. Projects such as that of the Women Economic Empowerment and Rural Development Project (WEE-RDP) heavily relied on working closely with the CDCs to carry out the project activities(World Bank, n.d.). Yet the structure on which such projects relied were heavily susceptible to elite manipulation, thus affecting the overall outcome and effectiveness of the projects, with most cases leading to embezzlement, and misappropriation of funds, and the projects were used by patronal elites for their gains, as pointed out before, elected official allocated more projects and funs to their patronage-networks.
Essentially, the role of the elites from the very beginning in the developmental projects and later on their interference with humanitarian projects have affected the overall efficacy and efficiency of these projects. The foundation on which the country was entering its developmental journey, which also served as the prime point for humanitarian aid has been flawed and corrupt. Though, attempts by various actors, including in the government and the private sector were made to overcome these difficulties and challenges. The, overall, influence that was exerted by the patrimonial elites, deep corruption within the government, and flaws in the foundations of developmental projects had greatly affected any effort rendered, if there were any, to overcome these challenges.
Localization of Western Norms:
As Afghanistan has a localist society, and mostly western norms clearly contradicts the local established norms. E.g. participation of women in developmental and humanitarian projects has been subject to criticism by local actors, including community leaders and the Taliban. Thus, most of the developmental and humanitarian aid projects, that heavily relied on promoting western norms and ideals of democracy, human rights, women rights, elections, and more, have been heavily localized at times completely contradicting or redefining the norms and developmental objectives of the projects to better suit the local conditions. As an example, a world bank funded project that aimed to economically uplift rural women, and increase their participation in socio-political and economic activities, the WEE-RDP project, initially designed to have women beneficiaries, was altered to better adjust to the local conditions. Essentially, the project’s name as discussed and explained to the communities was revised, from Women Economic Empowerment and Rural Development Program to Rural Development Program to subvert any backlashes from the communities. Similarly, men were added as the project’s beneficiaries to facilitate the implementation of the project in men-dominated communities. Thus, certain of the project’s intended goals and norms were adopted while others were either filtered or removed as was in its name. Kluczewska in an article on Tajikistan presented a similar dynamic in which she refers to the local conditions becoming a barrier as certain parts of the norms are adopted or filtered out(Kluczewska, 2019, pp. 359–360). In a similar vein, most of the humanitarian and developmental projects in Afghanistan were heavily localized primarily due to the localist structure and the actors involved in these project’s implementation. Thus, the NSP program, played a key role in the localization and adoption of western norms based on the community standards, and the elites that captured most of these local institutions profited from it in each of its stages(Anonymous, personal communication, May 4, 2022). Thus, these processes of localization of projects kept any risk low from the community’s backlash, and the localized version of these projects, at times deviated completely from the aims they were set to achieve, e.g., women economic empowerment.
Long-term consequences of elites’ Manipulations:
This paper primarily relied on one of the aspects of the developmental projects, the NSP, upon which most other projects relied, the extent to which corruption and manipulation of the elites extended were effectively rendering most of these developmental projects ineffective. These projects ranged from sectors of construction (roads, dams, buildings, etc.…), military, education, agriculture, economy, and more. It is reported by several outlets that corruption in the country, enabled by the US cash flow to the country, effectively rendered the government in Kabul ineffective to stand on its own feet(Wilkie, 2021). The cash inflow to the country, the approach that the Karzai administration took, initially and as a part of a policy standpoint earlier to establish viable local government institutions, and the freehand dealt with the Afghan political elites, led to the advancement of clientelism and patronage networks, where monetary or political support was provided to the government officials in return of political appointments, project contract awarding, or looking the other way when it came to widespread corruption, illegal dealings, embezzlement of developmental and aid money and more.
Similarly, the massive foreign aid that the country received after the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001, the lack of oversight over these funds, looking the other way when elites and warlords were involved in corruption, and paying ghost funds to corrupt officials, were some of the major points(Michel & Massaro, 2021), that left the elites reliant on such funds to come. Thus, it created an inherent problem as to what I would classify as ‘rent-seeking’ or as ‘privilege seeking’ as Henderson classifies it(Henderson, n.d.)— is referred to as the practice of relying on income without necessarily adding value to the process, or “to describe people’s lobbying of government to give them special privileges”(Henderson, n.d.). Both the national and local governments and the nation relied on this money to come to solve the daily problems and satisfy basic services and needs. However, it was the elites that made the most of it, due to administrative corruption, which incentivized them to rely on such cash inflow. A great example of this is when President Karzai openly admitted to receiving cash to keep him in power(Carberry, 2013), or as his expectation to receive billions of dollars without any oversight (Miklaszewski, 2013). This attitude of the Afghan government in Kabul and the political elites effectively rendered the Afghan state dysfunctional and led to unequal and opaque aid distribution of developmental and aid money that was susceptible to grand and pity corruption at all levels, that in turn had strong implications for the overall feasibility and success of developmental and humanitarian projects, all the while leaving the state-dependent on aid, that led to the ultimate collapse of the governmental institutions in August 2021.
Conclusion
In post-conflict countries such as that of Afghanistan, aid is an integral part of the reconstruction, development (political, economic, and social), and transition of these states. However, without proper oversight, political will, and transparent institutions that match that condition on the ground, it falls susceptible to manipulation that essentially renders it ineffective. In Afghanistan, the post-2001 institution-building processes, and how governance was approached by the Kabul administration and its allies heavily shaped the reality on the ground. The system adopted at the local level heavily relied on political elites, and their unchecked role in how local governance was approached. The level to which corruption infested the Afghan government branches led to a strong patronal and clientelist system, that affected the outcomes of these projects.
In this paper, drawing upon the case of Afghanistan, I argued that in developing countries with a strong clientelist system, and their impact on the realities on the ground, it leads to unequal and opaque aid distribution that is susceptible to grand and petty corruption at all levels, which in turn has strong implications for the overall feasibility and success of the developmental and humanitarian projects, leaving the state-dependent on such aid for years to come.
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[1] Based on the author’s personal experience working with CDCs in Laghman and on the interview with a project worker that worked on the NSP program.
[2] Based on the author’s personal experience working with CDCs in Laghman and on the interview with a project worker that worked on the NSP program.
